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The Eyewitness Conundrum
How Courts, Police and Attorneys
Can Reduce Mistakes by Eyewitnesses
By Bennett L. Gershman
cally, anecdotally, and intuitively.' An eyewitness
yewitnesses
make
mistakes.
We know
empiriwho
makes an
in-court
identification
of athis
defendant
is probably the most unreliable of witnesses. 2 The inherent weakness of eyewitness identification is confirmed
by the more than 200 post-conviction DNA exonerations,
and supported by an increasingly powerful body of social
science research. 3 Indeed, misidentification by eyewitnesses is claimed to be the largest single source of wrongful convictions and may in fact be responsible for more
wrongful convictions than all other causes combined. 4
Yet despite its inherent weakness, the testimony by
an eyewitness has a powerful impact on juries. One commentator has noted, "[Tihere is almost nothing more
convincing than a live human being who takes the stand,
points a finger at the defendant, and says, 'That's the
one!"' 5 Undeniably, eyewitnesses are critical to solving
crimes. Nevertheless, the recognition that some of these
witnesses have later been proved wrong makes it imperative that the principal participants in the criminal justice
system - judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and
police - develop new approaches to ensure the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and reduce the incidence of
courtroom misidentifications.

24

The Need for Protection Beyond
Wade v. United States
Since the landmark case of Wade v. United States,6 the
Supreme Court has provided modest constitutional protections against the most blatantly unfair kinds of police
identification procedures. Although Wade was a Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel case, the Court has most
often invoked the guarantees of due process to ensure
that pre-trial identification procedures employed by
law enforcement are not so "impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification." 7 As the Court noted, it
is the "likelihood of misidentification that violates ...
due process," 8 and suggestive identification procedures
increase that likelihood. 9 Since "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony," 10 the Court has enumerated several factors
that must be considered by trial courts in weighing the
extent to which the "corrupting effect of the suggestive
identification" tainted the witness's ability to make a
reliable courtroom identification.'1 These factors include
(1) the witness's opportunity to view the defendant, (2) the
degree of attention by the witness, (3) the accuracy of the
description given to the police, (4) the witness's level of
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certainty, and (5) the lapse of time between the crime and
12
the confrontation.
The due process guarantee offers only limited constitutional protection, however. Highly suggestive identification procedures often do not rise to the level of a
due process violation. Accordingly, given the seriousness
of the problem of eyewitness misidentification, judges,
prosecutors, police, and defense lawyers need to think
creatively and adopt policies and protocols that go
beyond the minimal protection afforded by due process.
For the trial judge, this means adopting special procedural safeguards that would enable juries to make a more
careful evaluation of the eyewitness's testimony. 13 For
the prosecutor, this means evaluating the eyewitness's
identification with greater care and not proceeding with
a case that rests on the uncorroborated testimony of an
eyewitness, unless the prosecutor is personally satisfied
beyond any reasonable doubt that the eyewitness is making a reliable identification.1 4 For the police, this means
employing pre-trial identification procedures that have
been demonstrated by a powerful body of scientific literature to ensure that identification procedures are administered in such a way as to enhance the accuracy of the
witness's identification, and to avoid procedures that are
more likely to produce mistaken identifications. 15 And
for defense counsel, this means aggressively investigating the eyewitness's background, account of the crime,
and encounters with the police; presenting all available
and accessible independent evidence of the client's innocence; and conducting an effective cross-examination that
is likely to expose deficiencies in the eyewitness's testimony.16 The following sections elaborate on the special
responsibilities of each of these participants.
The Role of the Trial Judge
Trial courts traditionally have viewed the testimony of
eyewitnesses as no different from the testimony of any
other kinds of witness. In general, these courts have
allowed the jury to evaluate the credibility of an eyewitness without any special instructions and have refused to
allow experts to assist the jury in understanding the way
in which perception and memory affect the reliability of
an eyewitness's identification. In light of the recent explosion of scientific research and findings on perception
and memory, however, and the increasing acknowledgment by courts and commentators that eyewitnesses are
often mistaken, it seems only reasonable that trial courts
should be open to new approaches to help jurors better
evaluate eyewitness credibility.
A trial judge can ensure that a jury is equipped to
analyze the testimony of identification witnesses, first,
by giving the jury a special instruction that cautions the
jurors to evaluate rigorously and carefully the courtroom
identification by an eyewitness, and, second, by allowing
experts to explain to the jury the kinds of factors that may

impair an eyewitness's ability to make an accurate and
reliable identification.
Jurors generally are unaware of the inherent weakness
of eyewitness identifications. 17 When identification is a
critical issue in a trial, courts should routinely respond
to the dangers of mistaken identification by formulating special cautionary jury instructions emphasizing the
fallibility of an eyewitness's identification and requiring
the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the eyewitness's identification is trustworthy. Such instructions
should focus the jury's attention on well-documented
factors, noted below, that affect the reliability of an eye18
witness's identification.
Several courts have formulated special cautionary
instructions on identification testimony. One such instruction, modeled after United States v. Telfaire,19 emphasizes
the importance of the issue of identification, the government's burden of proof, and the kinds of factors that the
jury should consider in evaluating the reliability of the
identification. Many of these factors have been cited by
courts and commentators as critical to the evaluation of
the identification testimony and are contained in pattern
criminal jury instructions. 20 Such instructions should
include: (1) whether the witness knew the offender
before the crime took place; (2) whether the witness had
a good opportunity to observe the offender; (3) whether
the witness was paying careful attention; (4) whether a
description given by the witness was close to the way
the offender actually looked; (5) the use of any suggestive or non-suggestive identification techniques; (6) the
lapse of time between the occurrence and the witness's
next opportunity to see the accused; and (7) whether
the witness failed to make an identification or made an
identification inconsistent with the identification he or
21
she made at trial.
When a witness's identification is weak or equivocal,
a stronger instruction is called for that emphasizes the
unreliability of eyewitness identifications and specifically
directs the jury to scrutinize the identification testimony
with great care and caution. 22 Many appellate courts,
while recommending that a special identification instruction be given in such a case, typically leave the matter
to the trial court's discretion. 23 Those courts that have
adopted this approach have indicated that it is unreasonable to impose a rigid requirement that the specific
instruction be given or an automatic reversal will result,
particularly when the identification testimony is credible. 24 Nevertheless, this more flexible approach almost
certainly would require that the issue of the reliability
of the eyewitness's identification be fairly presented to
the jury, and that the jury at a minimum be instructed to
consider the credibility and reliability of the identification
witness.25 When identification is a critical issue at trial,
however, the failure to give any guidance to a jury on the
26
issue of identification is likely to be found an error.
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In addition to giving the jury special cautionary
instructions on the dangers of eyewitness identification,
courts have also been asked to allow experts to testify
to the kinds of factors that have been found by scientific
research to contribute to mistaken eyewitness identifications. The kinds of subjects about which experts have
testified include: (1) the diminished accuracy of crossracial identifications; 27 (2) the diminished accuracy when
a weapon is present; 28 (3) the presence of extreme levels
of stress, which can impair memory;29 (4) the weakening
effect on memory of the passage of time; 30 (5) the influ31
ence of the initial identification on later identifications;
(6) the lack of correlation between the confidence of a
witness and the accuracy of the witness's identification;32
(7) the impact of suggestive pre-trial identification procedures on the reliability of the eyewitness identification;33
(8) the tendency of eyewitnesses to identify the person
from the lineup who in their opinion looks most like the
perpetrator; 34 and (9) the lack of correlation between the
amount of time that a witness viewed the perpetrator and
the witness's memory and retention of the event. 35
Many courts disfavor expert testimony regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, believing it
not helpful to a jury, and potentially confusing. 36 This is
particularly true in cases in which the eyewitness identification evidence is compelling, or other evidence of guilt
corroborates the eyewitness's testimony. 37 Nevertheless,
the unmistakable trend, particularly among state courts,
has been to allow experts to testify on the reliability of
eyewitness identifications. 38 Such testimony typically
addresses the well-documented factors, noted above,
that can render an eyewitness's identification untrustworthy.39 In addition, the testimony of experts may be
necessary to counter many widely held misconceptions
about the supposed reliability of identifications, and to
apprise the jury of factors that might contribute to an
inaccurate identification. 40 Experts most often are permitted to testify when the identification evidence is weak,
and convictions have been reversed when trial courts
have unreasonably excluded such proof.41
When courts are asked to allow experts to testify to
novel scientific theories, they must assume the role of
"gatekeeper" to determine whether a sufficient foundation has been laid for the introduction of such testimony.
The federal courts, and many state courts, apply the foundational test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,42 under which scientific expert testimony is admissible if the evidence (1) is based on "scientific knowledge," and (2) will "assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue." 43 As noted above, courts
that refuse to allow expert testimony on the fallibility of
eyewitness identifications claim that such testimony is
unnecessary and confusing, and may usurp the function
of the jury in deciding questions of witness credibility.
If an indigent defendant makes a proper request for an

expert on eyewitness identification, the failure of a court
to provide funds for the retention of the expert is likely
an error if the defendant can demonstrate that a reasonably competent attorney for a paying client would have
sought the assistance of the expert, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the lack of expert assistance. 44
The Function of the Prosecutor
Many prosecutors view their role not simply as that of
a partisan bent on obtaining a conviction, but as a neutral advocate who has a responsibility to assemble the
evidence of guilt, place that evidence before a jury fairly
and effectively, and allow the adversary system to produce an acceptable result. Thus, as one local prosecutor
stated following the dismissal of a murder case in which
an innocent defendant spent eight years in jail, based on
mistaken identification: "We live by an adversarial system. Our job is to present evidence we believe is credible.
The defense's job is to poke holes in it. In a sense, the
system worked, although it took some time."45 Another
prosecutor made the following remark: "If the [alleged
rape victim] came in and said she could not identify her
assailants, then we don't have a case. If she says, yes, it's
them, or one or two of them I have an obligation to put
46
that to a jury."
These comments present the question starkly: Did
these prosecutors have an "obligation" to place these
cases before a jury? Or did the prosecutors have an obligation to make an impartial and objective determination
of the quality of the witnesses' identification before asking a jury to convict? The approach by the prosecutors in
the above cases may well be incompatible with a prosecutor's constitutional and ethical responsibility to serve
the cause of justice and to protect innocent persons from
47
erroneous convictions.
Prosecutors' responsibility to serve truth and justice
requires them to make an independent evaluation of the
credibility of the witnesses, the reliability of the evidence,
and the truth of the defendant's guilt before putting the
case before a jury. With respect to eyewitnesses, there is
little doubt that an experienced prosecutor is much better
qualified than a jury at judging their reliability.48 A prosecutor has more information about the background of the
witness, has spent more time studying the evidence, is
familiar with the relevant literature on eyewitness credibility, and has acquired courtroom experience in prosecuting other cases involving eyewitness identifications.
A prosecutor's informal evaluation of an eyewitness's reliability is more trustworthy than that of a jury
because a prosecutor can more readily maintain a neutral
and objective view of the evidence. A jury's view of the
evidence, particularly the testimony of an eyewitness,
is typically influenced by a variety of prejudicial, nonevidentiary factors.49 And, ironically, a prosecutor, even
one who entertains a reasonable doubt about the reli-
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ability of his or her witnesses, may impress a jury with
the strength of the case merely by virtue of the decision
to prosecute. Juries trust prosecutors; they are impressed
by the prosecutor's prestige and expertises 0 Indeed,
jurors may reasonably assume that the prosecutor would
not have brought the case in the first place if he or she
harbored any doubt, and the jury may further assume
that additional evidence probably exists to support the
hypothesis of guilt. The danger of letting a jury decide a
questionable case involving weak eyewitness testimony
is that juries usually reach a verdict, and that verdict usually is guilty.51

eyewitnesses in the murder trial of Randall Dale Adams,
memorialized in the film documentary The Thin Blue
Line,55 offers a dramatic commentary on the susceptibility of juries to powerful but false identification testimony
offered by a venal prosecutor. The film presents these
identification witnesses as having given their testimony
confidently, even with bravado, under circumstances in
which they almost certainly knew that their testimony
was false. 56
Apart from an affirmative responsibility to promote
the truth, a prosecutor has a corresponding duty not to
engage in conduct that disserves the truth. Some prosecu-

The courts have not been especially vigilant about suggestive
interviewing techniques, leaving it up to the adversary process
to expose weaknesses and improprieties.
Where the testimony of an eyewitness is determinative of guilt, the prosecutor should approach the case
with a healthy skepticism, a willingness to subject the
hypothesis of guilt to rigorous testing, and the courage
to decline prosecution if he or she entertains a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt. A prosecutor's evaluation
of the reliability of eyewitnesses should be influenced
by the quality of the police investigation. Thus, a prosecutor's determination of the accuracy of the eyewitness
should depend to a very large extent on prior encounters
between the witness and the police. A prosecutor should
be vigilant in learning whether the police employed suggestive techniques in obtaining a pre-trial identification
from an eyewitness.
A prosecutor should be alert to any motive a witness
might have to falsify. One of the difficulties in evaluating
the credibility of eyewitnesses is that they typically have
no motive to make a false identification. In such cases,
the question that is frequently encountered is whether
the eyewitness is simply making a mistake - whether the
52
witness's confidence in the identification is justified.
In other cases, however, an eyewitness may be deliberately falsifying an identification, and a prosecutor has a
responsibility to scrutinize carefully the background of
that witness.
In one highly publicized wrongful conviction case, the
defendant spent eight years in jail for a double murder he
did not commit, based on the uncorroborated testimony
of an alleged eyewitness.5 3 In that instance, the prosecutor was negligent in failing to investigate his witness's
background. Had he done so, he would have learned that
the witness was a psychopathic liar who was in prison in
another state at the time he claimed to have witnessed
the double murder. 54 Similarly, the testimony of several

tors, either consciously or unconsciously, try to "adjust"
or "polish up" the testimony of their identification
witness to strengthen the probative force of their identification. Through various kinds of coaching, some prosecutors overtly, covertly, or unintentionally elicit from
eyewitnesses additional facts that "adjust" the witness's
memory and thereby improve the testimony, as well as
57
create an artificial aura of certainty and confidence.
This "coaching" process is exemplified by the testimony
of key identification witnesses in three recent Supreme
Court cases - Banks v. Dreke,58 Strickler v. Greene,59 and
Kyles v. Whitley.60 The eyewitness's testimony in each
of these cases was confident and convincing. Yet there
is every reason to believe that their testimony was
embellished - even contrived - as a result of coach-

ing by the prosecutors. Moreover, as the above cases
indicate, the courts have not been especially vigilant
about suggestive interviewing techniques of witnesses,
leaving it up to the adversary process to expose weaknesses and improprieties. And even assuming highly
skilled defense counsel able to test the accuracy and
truthfulness of the eyewitness - a basic postulate of the
adversary system's effectiveness - the process necessarily malfunctions when the prosecutor is able to control
and shape the information, and eliminate or polish up
information detrimental to his or her case. To the extent
that the above cases exemplify the process of eyewitness
preparation by careless or even venal prosecutors, they
provide a devastating commentary on the artificiality of
courtroom testimony by eyewitnesses, the corresponding difficulty of the criminal justice system in reducing
jury mistakes that produce miscarriages of justice, and
the need for new approaches to lessen the instances of
misidentifications.61
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Police Procedures
When a crime is reported, the police usually make the
initial contact with victims and witnesses. When the
perpetrator is unknown, the police employ a variety
of procedures to attempt to identify a suspect. 62 These
procedures typically seek to minimize suggestiveness
by having the witness view a lineup containing several
individuals standing together or having the witness view
an array of photographs. 63 To be sure, there may be occasions when the police believe it is necessary to have the
witness view a suspect in isolation or show the witness
a single photograph. These latter encounters - denominated "show-ups" - are inherently suggestive and may
violate due process. 64

Recording the details of
the identification during

or immediately after the
process is critical.
The manner in which the police administer an identification procedure also may violate due process. The
Supreme Court in United States v. Wade65 described the
kinds of suggestive procedures that contribute to mistaken identifications. The police might suggest to the witness
the identity of the perpetrator or that the perpetrator is in
the array; they might create a lineup in which a particular characteristic of one person in the array would likely
draw the viewer's attention, or where one person in the
array was dramatically different in appearance from the
others in the group; or the police might allow several witnesses to view the lineup together.
The police can minimize suggestiveness in identification practices in several ways. Police probably are aware
that when they present an eyewitness with a lineup,
show-up, or photographic array, the eyewitness reasonably assumes that the police consider one of the persons
to be the suspect. 66 The eyewitness in such a case might
feel obligated to identify a person in the group who
in the opinion of the eyewitness looks most like the
perpetrator relative to the other members of the group.
This phenomenon - known as the "relative judgment
process" - has been borne out by scientific research. 67
The police may be able to neutralize this relative judgment process by affirmatively advising the eyewitness
that the perpetrator might or might not be present in
the identification procedure. Guidelines published by
the National Institute of Justice suggest that, prior to a
lineup, the witness should be instructed "that the person
who committed the crime may or may not be present in
the group of individuals." 68

The police also can neutralize the relative judgment
process by using what is known as a "sequential lineup."
A sequential lineup involves showing the persons in the
group - including a suspect and any fillers - one at a time
rather than employing the customary practice of showing
them all together. The benefit of a sequential lineup is that
the viewer makes an identification based on a recollection
of the incident and compares the person being viewed
with the person he or she recalls as being involved in the
incident. 69 The extent to which sequential lineups represent an important prophylactic against mistaken identifications is unclear, however. Experts claim that sequential
lineups may reduce false identifications but also may
70
reduce correct identifications.
Another innovation advocated by researchers is the
practice of using a "double-blind" lineup, where the
officer conducting the lineup has no knowledge of the
facts of the investigation and does not know whether
any suspect is present in the lineup. Commentators claim
that this practice reduces the chance that a police officer
involved in the investigation may consciously or unconsciously telegraph cues regarding a particular individual.
Double-blind testing traditionally has been a universally
accepted methodology in scientific research and there is
no reason why it should not become an accepted practice
when police administer any type of lineup procedure.
Finally, the police should make every effort to record
the details of the identification procedure, regardless
whether it results in a positive identification, a nonidentification, or a "near miss" or "near hit" where the
71
identification is tentative, uncertain, and inconclusive.
Clearly, any dialogue between the police officer administering the lineup and the witness may be critical to
understanding the level of confidence or uncertainty of
the witness, and whether any suggestive cues occurred
during the lineup procedure. 72 Recording the details of
the identification during or immediately after the process
is critical; it is likely that neither the officer nor the witness will accurately recall the details of the process after a
lapse of time. Thus, guidelines must be issued that would
require the lineup administrator to record in writing or,
where feasible, electronically, the identification procedure
employed. This should include a complete and accurate
record of any resulting identification and non-identification, in the witness's own words, and indicate the witness's level of confidence, as well as a verbatim account
73
of any exchange between the witness and the police.
The Task of Defense Counsel
Representing a client who claims that he or she is innocent and has been wrongly identified poses one of the
most daunting challenges to any defense lawyer. The
lawyer knows from experience that the traditional truthtesting tools that might expose a witness's motive to
lie are usually ineffective in the case of an eyewitness.
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Demonstrating that an eyewitness is mistaken is extraordinarily difficult, particularly when the witness appears
to be a sympathetic crime victim who has no motive to
falsely accuse the defendant, and who insists that the
identification is correct. Some attorneys are not up to
this challenge, and a failure to effectively confront the
prosecution's evidence is a significant cause of wrongful
convictions. 74
A lawyer representing a criminal defendant operates within a constitutional framework that requires the
lawyer, at a minimum, to provide reasonably competent
assistance. 75 To be sure, when misidentification is a
critical issue, an attorney must become familiar with the
legal and scientific literature on the "vagaries of eyewitness identification." 76 Moreover, again at a minimum,
an attorney who represents a client who claims he is the
"wrong man" must travel several roads in an effort to
undermine the identification. The lawyer must aggressively investigate the background of the eyewitness,
challenge the circumstances of the initial viewing of the
accused, intelligently confront the eyewitness's testimony in court, and produce independent evidence proving
that the client has been wrongly accused.
An attorney has a duty to attempt to locate and
interview witnesses, including alibi witnesses who the
defendant claims possess knowledge concerning the
defendant's actions. 77 An attorney also has a duty to learn
the physical details of the place where the crime occurred,
and the physical, emotional, or psychological infirmi78
ties of the eyewitness, for use in cross-examination.
Indeed, inasmuch as cross-examination is claimed to be
the most important adversarial safeguard to discovering
the truth, 79 defense counsel should thoroughly prepare
an effective strategy to challenge the eyewitness's identification, including an inquiry into the kinds of factors
that may affect the eyewitness's memory and perception,
and conduct an effective cross-examination.80 Courts
must afford defense counsel a meaningful opportunity
to probe the reliability of an identification witness's testimony.81 Defense counsel should also seek out a scientific
expert who could testify about the way memory and
perception affect the reliability of an eyewitness's identification, as well as the kinds of factors that contribute to
misidentifications. 82 Assuming that defense counsel has
made a sufficient offer of proof, he or she should be prepared to support the offer of proof at a pre-trial in limine
83
evidentiary hearing.
Convinced of their client's innocence, some defense
lawyers may decide to approach the prosecutor with
representations of that innocence. Many prosecutors are
alert to a defense attorney's representations that the client is innocent, especially when the appeal comes from
84
a defense attorney whom the prosecutor trusts. Such
claims probably are made sparingly so as not to impair
an attorney's credibility. When given reason to doubt the

eyewitness's accuracy, a prosecutor may take a "second
look" at the case and possibly subject the eyewitness
to a vigorous interrogation of the kind that might be
expected from a skilled defense counsel at trial. Some
prosecutors use polygraph examinations to clear innocent
suspects or as a basis for further examination. 85 When a
defense attorney represents that his or her client is innocent and that the client is willing to take a lie detector test,
it would appear that a prosecutor incurs no significant
disadvantage in administering such a test.
Finally, there may be opportunities for defense counsel to protect his or her client from an unfair courtroom
identification by devising techniques to challenge the
eyewitness inside the courtroom with a simulated identification procedure. Thus, counsel might request that
the court allow an in-court line-up with other persons of
similar description or have the defendant sit in the spectators' gallery or place more than one person at counsel
table. Such a strategy obviously carries the risk that the
witness will make a correct identification of the defendant. Defense attorneys have also devised questionable
ploys to trick witnesses into misidentifying a defendant,
such as substituting an individual at the counsel table
who looks like the defendant, and who sits there while
the prosecution's eyewitness misidentifies the stand-in as
the perpetrator. 86

Conclusion
Reducing the incidence of wrongful convictions based
on eyewitness mistakes poses a difficult challenge to
the criminal justice system. There is near-unanimity
among courts and commentators that eyewitness mistakes account for more erroneous convictions than any
other type of proof. It is therefore incumbent on every
key participant in the criminal justice system - judge,
prosecutor, police, and defense counsel - to use every
available tool to protect an accused from being mistakenly identified by an eyewitness. For the judge, protecting
the accused requires a willingness to give the jury special
instructions on eyewitness identification and a willingness to allow the use of experts to inform the jury of the
issues concerning the reliability of eyewitnesses. For the
prosecutor, protecting the accused requires a willingness
to undertake an objective and impartial investigation of
the reliability of his or her eyewitnesses, and to refuse to
present such witnesses when the prosecutor entertains a
reasonable doubt about the accuracy of identifications.
For the police, protecting persons from mistaken identifications requires the employment of new techniques that
are capable of preventing the kinds of suggestiveness
that taint the witness's in-court identification and create the potential for an unjust conviction of an innocent
defendant. And for the defense attorney, protecting the
client means more than simply providing constitutionally
competent representation but, in addition, being willing
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to aggressively challenge the prosecutor's evidence to
minimize the chance that the client will be wrongly convicted. i
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level of certainty by the witness at the identification and the accuracy of that
identification").
33. See United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132, 1139-40 (D.N.J. 1996).
34. The phenomenon is known as the "relative judgment process." See
Ledbetter, 881 A.2d at 314 (citing empirical studies supporting this phenomenon).

9. The Court has considered on several occasions the scope of the due process protection against the admission of evidence derived from, for suggestive
identification procedures. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (totality of
circumstances is test to determine whether suggestive show-up violates due
process); Simmons, 390 U.S. 377 (initial identification by suggestive photographic array did not violate due process); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440
(1969) (procedures used to obtain identifications violated due process); Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (pre-trial procedures used did not taint in-court
identification); Neil, 409 U.S. 188 (discussing factors to be considered in evaluating likelihood of misidentification); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)
(applying factors in Biggers to find no violation of due process).
10. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.

35. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. at 1138.
36. See United States v. Welch, 368 F.3d 970 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding exclusion
of expert testimony as not capable of assisting jury); United States v. Kime, 99
F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) ("minimal probative value of the proffered expert
testimony is outweighed by the danger of juror confusion"); United States v.
Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986) ("expert's testimony would have done
nothing but "muddy the waters"); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375
(9th Cir. 1980) ("the admissibility of this type of expert testimony is strongly
disfavored by most courts").
37. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1052 (7th Cir. 1992) (eyewitness testimony supported by much other evidence).
38. See, e.g., State v. Cheatam, 81 P.3d 830 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); State v. DuBray,
77 P.3d 247 (Mont. 2003); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98 S.W.3d 485 (Ky. 2002);
People v. Lee, 96 N.Y.2d 157, 726 N.Y.S.2d 361 (2001); Johnson v. State, 526 S.E.2d
549 (Ga. 2000).

11. Id.
12. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200.
13. See infra "The Role of the Trial Judge."

39. See supra notes and accompanying text.

14. See infra "The Function of the Prosecutor."
15. See infra "Police Procedures."
16. See infra "The Task of Defense Counsel."
17. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986) ("jurors do not appreciate the
fallibility of eyewitness testimony").
18. See infra notes 27-35, and accompanying text.
19. 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
20. See Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Federal Judicial Center 44-45
(1988); Comment at 45 ("For cases where such an identification will be determinative, a careful detailed instruction should be given to minimize any chance of
misidentification.").
21. Id.
22. See United States v. Barber,442 F.2d 517, 525 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971) (advising jury
that "identification must be scrutinized with great care").
23. See United States v. Johnson, 848 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Thoma, 713 F.2d 604,607-08 (10th Cir. 1983); People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273, 464
N.Y.S.2d 454 (1983).

40. See People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990) (dissenting
opinion) ("The notion that jurors are generally aware from their everyday
experience of the factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation
and identification has not only been properly condemned as 'makeshift reasoning' ... but has been refuted by research demonstrating a number of common
and widely held misconceptions on the subject among laypersons").
41. See Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380 (excluding expert testimony regarding correlation between accuracy and confidence in eyewitness identifications was abuse
of discretion); Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (excluding expert testimony on reliability
of eyewitness identification because court believed it could never be helpful to
jury was abuse of discretion); People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523
(2007) (excluding expert testimony on reliability of eyewitness identification
when there was no evidence corroborating the witness's identification testimony was abuse of discretion).
42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert superseded Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923), which remains the standard is several states. Under Frye,
expert testimony on novel scientific evidence is admissible if "the thing from
which the deduction is made [is] sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." Id. at 1014. However,
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"[tihere is rapidly growing dissatisfaction among courts and commentators
with the Frye test." Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d at 830 (dissenting opinion).
43. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. Daubert provided trial judges with a series of
"general observations" to determine whether a theory or technique is based
upon "scientific knowledge" and is reliable. Such factors include (1) whether
the expert's theory or technique can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether
the methodology has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the
frequency by which the methodology leads to erroneous results; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and
(5) whether the methodology has been generally accepted in the scientific community. Id. at 593-94. See also Fed. Rule Evid. 702.
44. United States v. Labansat, 94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1996) ("it is unlikely that
a reasonably competent attorney would have incurred the expense of hiring an
eyewitness identification expert."); State v. Reynolds, 639 P.2d 461 (Kan. 1982)
(no abuse of discretion in refusing to authorize services of expert on eyewitness
identification).
45. See Jim Yardley, Man Is Cleared in Murder Case After Eight Years, N.Y. Tunes,
Oct. 29, 1998, at B1.
46. See David Barstow & Duff Wilson, Charges of Rape Against 3 at Duke Are
Dropped, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 23, 2006.
47. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The prosecutor's] interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done."). See also Model Rules Of Professional Conduct Rule
3.8, Comment 1 (1983) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate."); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely
to convict."); ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function
Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993). See also Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Truth, 14 Geo. J.Legal Ethics 309, 314-15 (2001) ("prosecutor has the
overriding [constitutional and ethical] responsibility not simply to convict the
guilty but to protect the innocent").
48. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and
Proofof Guilt, 16 J. Legal Stud. 395, 446 (1987) ("There is every reason to believe
that prosecutors, with more information at their disposal and more experience, are considerably better than juries at judging identification in criminal
cases.").
49. See Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury
232 (1983) (discussing how inadmissible evidence and stricken testimony has
impact on juror's decision making).
50. See United States v.Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("prosecutor's opinion
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to
trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence").

60. 514 U.S. 419, 443 & n.14, 454 (1995) (finding a clear implication of witness
coaching from suppressed evidence as well as fact that testimony at subsequent trial was much more precise than at an earlier trial).
61. It should be noted that the prosecutor in each of the above cases not only
engaged in impermissible witness-coaching but also withheld exculpatory
evidence that would have severely discredited the witnesses' testimony. See
Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev.685
(2006).
62. Police often create a composite sketch of the perpetrator prepared by
the victim and the police artist in order to reflect the witness's recollection.
See People v. Maldonado, 97 N.Y.2d 522, 526, 743 N.Y.2d 389 (2002) (composite
sketches are "critical investigative tools" in the way they "winnow the class of
suspects from the infinite down to a lesser number of people" but are inadmissible as hearsay to prove a defendant's guilt unless they are used to rebut a
charge of recent fabrication).
63. Given the practical difficulties of assembling a live lineup containing a fair
sampling of persons resembling the perpetrator, it may be less suggestive to
create a fair array through use of a photographic spread obtained from a computer that has been programmed to produce pictures of persons that are similar
to the defendant. For an discussion of the comparative suggestiveness of a live
lineup and a photo-spread, see People v. Burrowes, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 2004, p. 21,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 387 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 2004) (placement of
one narcotics offender in same cell as person whom he had earlier been unable
to identify and whom he later identified was unnecessarily suggestive and
tainted reliability of in-court identification).
65. 388 U.S. 218, 229-34 (1967).
66. See State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 314 (Conn. 2005).
67. Id.
68. See National Institute of Justice, Eyewitness Identification: A Guide for Law
Enforcement, U.S. Dept. of Justice Pub. No. NCJ 1788240 (1999), at 32.
69. A substantial body of empirical data supports the reliability of sequential
lineup procedures. Guidelines issued by the United States Department of
Justice and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey endorse the sequential lineup procedure. See In re Wilson, 191 Misc. 2d 224, 741 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup.
Ct., Kings Co. 2002). The first reported case to use the sequential lineup is State
v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1983).
70. Compare In re Thomas, 189 Misc. 2d 487, 733 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Sup. Ct., Kings
Co. 2001) ("scientific community is unanimous in finding that sequential
lineups are fairer and result in more accurate identification") with Wilson, 191
Misc. 2d 224 ("researchers have noted that in cases involving multiple perpetrators or child witnesses sequential lineups may be inferior to simultaneous
lineups.").

51. See Harry Kalven & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 55-63 (1966).
52. See State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 311 (2005) ("a weak correlation, at most,
exists between the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness and the accuracy of that identification").
53. See Jim Yardley, Man Is Cleared in Murder CaseAfter Eight Years, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1998, at B1.
54. See Kristin Choo, Perjury With Conviction: Lawyers Can Use Strategic Tactics
at Trial to Expose Pathological Liars on the Witness Stand, A.B.A.J., June, 1999, at
71 (discussing wrongful prosecution of Jeffrey Blake, convicted of a double
murder based on testimony of Dana Garner, a psychopathic liar whose bizarre
and uncorroborated eyewitness testimony should have been more carefully
scrutinized by prosecutor).
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55. Miramax Films (1988).
56. See Bennett L. Gershman, Film Review, The Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in
the Fact-FindingProcess?, 9 Pace L. Rev. 275, 287-94 (1989).
57. See Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 Cardozo L.
Rev. 829, 846 (2002).
58. 540 U.S. 668, 677, 685, 705 (2004) (stating that a suppressed transcript of
pretrial practice sessions shows how the prosecutor "intensively coached" and
"closely rehearsed" the testimony of witnesses).
59. 527 U.S. 263, 272-75 (1999) (eyewitness initially told police she had only
"muddled memories" of event but after series of extensive interviews with
police and prosecutor gave an astonishingly detailed account of the event,
claiming "I have an exceptionally good memory").
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71. See State v.Delgado, 902 A.2d 888 (N.J. 2006).
72. Id. at 894. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 318-19 (1973) (selection
of person other than accused or inability of witness to make any selection is
useful to defense).
73. See Delgado, 902 A.2d at 895-97.
74. See Dwyer et al., supra note 4, at 183. See also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for
the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103
Yale L.J.
1835 (1994); Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers Puts Innocents on
Death Row, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5,2000, at Al.

81. Harper v. Kelly, 916 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1990) (court's preclusion of defense
attorney's inquiry into victim's emotional state during robbery infringed harmfully on defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.).
82. See supra "The Role of the Trial Judge."

75. See Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
76. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)
77. See Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2005) (deficient performance in failing to present adequate alibi defense); Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620 (7th
Cir. 2000) (counsel fails to contact or produce critical alibi witnesses); Lawrence
v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1990) (duty to pursue alibi defense);
Demarest v. Price, 905 F. Supp. 1432 (D. Colo. 1995) (complete failure to investigate state's case and interview witnesses), vacated by 130 F.3d 922 (10th Cir.
1997). But see DeLuca v.Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 588 n.3 (2d Cir. 1996) (alibi defense
need not be investigated if counsel believes it is improbable).
78. See Helton v.Sec'y of Dep't of Corr.,233 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000) (failure to
investigate or present physical evidence regarding victim).
79. 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, at 32 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed.
1974) (describing cross-examination as "the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth").
80. See Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Counsel had in
his hands material for a devastating cross-examination of [complainant] on the
critical issue in the case. Because of his failure to confront her with her prior
sworn testimony, the jury did not learn that she had previously described the
height of her attackers under oath, that she had previously recanted prior tes-
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timony given under oath and that her prior descriptions were much different
from her testimony at the trial."); Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d 701, 710-11 (8th Cir.
1995) ("[Tlhere is no objectively reasonable basis on which competent defense
counsel could justify a decision not to impeach a state's eyewitness whose
testimony, as the district court points out, took on such remarkable detail and
clarity over time.").
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83. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir. 1985) (in limine hearing the most efficient procedure that court can use in making determination of
reliability); State v. Gunter, 554 A.2d 1356, 1357 (N.J. Super. 1989) ("[Tlhe question of the admissibility of the [expert's] evidence proffered here could only
have been resolved by a hearing.., to determine its scientific reliability and the
extent to which, if at all, it would have assisted the jury in its understanding of
the relevant matters beyond the common knowledge of human experience.").
84. See Lief H. Carter, The Limits of Order 85 (1974) ("[T]he prosecutor adjusts
to cues from the defense attorney, the most important of which is the defense
attorney's trustworthiness.").
85. Id. at 123 (describing policy in one prosecutor's office of "willingness to
dismiss a case when polygraph examination indicated the suspect's innocence," and agreement between prosecutors and defense counsel "that if suspect failed the test he would plead guilty rather than take the case to trial.").
86. See United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Simac,
641 N.E.2d 416 (1l. 1994); Miskovsky v. State ex rel. Jones, 586 P.2d 1104 (Okla.
App. 1978). See also ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Opinion No. 914 (1966) (unethical conduct for attorney to participate
in substitution of other persons for true defendants).
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